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THE SECURITY COURT 
MATT STEILEN 
ABSTRACT 
 The Supreme Court is concerned not only with the limits of our 
government’s power to protect us, but also with how it protects us.  
Government can protect us by passing laws that grant powers to 
its agencies or by conferring discretion on the officers in those 
agencies.  Security by law is preferable to the extent that it pro-
motes rule of law values—certainty, predictability, uniformity, 
and so on—but, security by discretion is preferable to the extent 
that it gives government the room it needs to meet threats in 
whatever form they present themselves.  Drawing a line between 
security by law and security by discretion is an important and 
long-standing jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, 
although it is rarely acknowledged as such and entangled with the 
more general law of separation of powers.  In some separation of 
powers cases, however, where both political branches have a col-
orable textual and historical claim to exercise authority, it is the 
Court’s concern with preserving the rule of law or making room 
for necessary discretion that tilts the balance in favor of one 
branch or another.  This Essay begins by examining an important 
nineteenth-century case, In re Neagle, and shows how Justices 
cleaved around the distinction between security by law and secu-
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rity by discretion.  This Essay then describes a line of cases, be-
ginning in the early republic, in which the Court was concerned 
with how government secures us.  Finally, this Essay identifies 
cases when the Court shrunk from this role and explains why. 
 
An unfortunate aspect of today’s constitutional law canon is the dearth 
of late-nineteenth-century cases.  We read through the period always en route 
to somewhere else—to West Coast Hotel,1 to Jones & Laughlin Steel,2 to 
Brown,3 to a single footnote in a case about filled milk.4  Events today, 
however, continue to suggest the relevance of the nineteenth century for our 
own constitutional self-understanding.  We should tell some stories about 
our fundamental law that begin or end here, or at least pause.  There are sto-
ries to tell about racial apartheid, empire and individual rights, and, I think, 
security and government.  This Essay tells a story about the role of the Su-
preme Court in matters of security, and while it does not begin in the fin de 
siècle, or end there, it does more than watch the station flash past from a 
seat on the train.  I begin with an important and thrilling case, which all of 
us should know, and use the case to frame a narrative about the role of the 
Supreme Court in matters of security. 
The case is In re Neagle.5  It involves two chief justices of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court who served in successive terms.  The first was David S. 
Terry, born in Kentucky in 1823 to a family of Scotch-Irish descent.  His 
parents moved to Texas in 1835 and soon both died, leaving their thirteen-
year-old boy, as he later put it, “to my own guardianship.”6  Terry made use 
of his freedom the way we imagine a thirteen-year-old might and found his 
way, later that year, into the Texas War of Independence.  He grew tall, 
standing six-foot-three, with what one contemporary called “Atlantean 
shoulders and sinews.”7  At age twenty-seven, Terry traveled to California 
where he engaged in some “Indian fighting” and mined for gold in Calaveras 
County.  It was a free time in the West and men like him could move be-
tween occupations and classes in ways that seem unimaginable to us now.  
One year later, Terry ran for mayor of Stockton but lost.  He opened a law 
practice, and in late 1855, at age thirty-three, five years after arriving in the 
state, he was elected to its supreme court.  Terry’s opinions have been de-
scribed as “terse, logical and generally sound,” which was surely praise, but 
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one senses the law did not leave too deep an impression on the man.8  Dur-
ing his first year in judicial office, Terry stabbed someone in the neck dur-
ing an armed standoff.  Two years later he became involved in a public 
dispute with David Broderick, United States Senator from California; Ter-
ry resigned his judgeship, challenged the senator to a duel, and shot him 
dead.  Terry promptly left California for Texas to fight with the Confederate 
Army in the Civil War.9 
The second of our chief justices is much better known, although not 
for vividness of biography.  This is Stephen J. Field, who became Chief Jus-
tice of the California Supreme Court in 1859 upon Terry’s resignation and 
was elevated several years later by President Lincoln to the United States 
Supreme Court.  Field was born in 1816 into a sophisticated New England 
family.  He attended Williams College and practiced law in New York City 
with his brother, David Dudley Field, Jr. (known to us for his “Field Code of 
Civil Procedure”).  In 1848, Stephen traveled to California to make his for-
tune in the gold rush.  He called in a debt owed to his brother and used the 
money to speculate in land.  For a time, he had success and was soon elect-
ed to the state legislature.  It is perhaps telling of the difference between 
Field and Terry that when Field was challenged to a duel, “no shots were ex-
changed” “[f]or various reasons.”10  The result was fortuitous for Field, who 
later professed never to carry a firearm.  He was appointed to the California 
Supreme Court in 1857, where he served with Terry for two years.11 
The Neagle case arose out of a bizarre series of events that unfolded 
when Terry returned to California after the Civil War.  He married a woman 
named Sarah Hill, who claimed rights by an earlier marriage to half the as-
sets of a deceased Nevada silver baron.  Oddly enough, Justice Field pre-
sided over litigation contesting the validity of the marriage contract, sitting 
in his capacity as a federal circuit judge.  At one point in the proceedings, 
David Terry became so irate that he punched the Federal Marshal, breaking 
one of his teeth, and then pulled a nine-inch bowie knife from his jacket as 
deputy marshals attempted to remove him from the courtroom.12  Justice 
Field found him in contempt of court, but it did little to deter Terry, who 
began to threaten Justice Field as soon as he was released from custody.  He 
would “horsewhip” Field, Terry said, and if the Justice “resent[ed] it,” he 
would kill him.13  Newspapers covered the story relentlessly.14 
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Back in Washington, the United States Attorney General wrote to the 
Federal Marshal in San Francisco, expressing concern for Field’s safety.  To 
protect Field while he traveled between courthouses in Los Angeles and San 
Francisco, the Attorney General ordered the Marshal to “employ certain spe-
cial deputies” as bodyguards.15  The Marshal appointed David Neagle, a 
“small and wiry” man who served as Chief of Police in Tombstone, Arizo-
na.16  During the next session of the circuit court, Deputy Neagle accompa-
nied Justice Field, traveling with him between courthouses by train.  Even-
tually, David Terry found his way onto one of those trains.  While Field and 
Neagle were eating breakfast in a dining car en route to San Francisco, Ter-
ry approached them and slapped Justice Field in the face.  Neagle stood up 
and shouted, “Stop!”17  Terry slapped Field again; Neagle drew his revolver 
and shot him twice.  Terry fell to the ground dead.  He had no firearm on 
him.18 
Deputy Neagle was arrested and charged with murder by the state of 
California.  He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the 
State should discharge him because he acted, as the habeas statute stated, 
“in pursuance of a law of the United States.”19  But there was no statute au-
thorizing federal marshals to act as bodyguards to federal judges outside of 
court.  There was only a letter from the Attorney General directing the Mar-
shal to appoint “special deputies” to protect Field.20  Did this letter exempt a 
man from a state’s criminal law?  The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the discharge of Deputy Neagle,21 but, remarkably, there was a dis-
sent. Justice Lamar and Chief Justice Fuller would have recommitted the 
deputy to the custody of the sheriff.22  Why? 
At its core, the dispute between the majority and the dissent was about 
how the government protects itself and us.  It was a dispute about the proper 
form of acts to protect and secure.  One form is law.  We are a government 
of laws, Justice Marshall reminded us in Marbury v. Madison,23 and a gov-
ernment of laws protects itself and its citizens by passing laws.24  To that 
end, many of the legislative powers vested in Congress by the Constitution 
                                                          
 15.  Id. at 51. 
 16.  Lewis, supra note 12, at 478. 
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 18.  Result of the Investigation by the Coroner, DAILY EVENING BULL., Aug 15, 1889, at 1. 
 19.  In re Neagle, 135 U.S. at 40. 
 20.  Id. at 51. 
 21.  Id. at 76.  
 22.  Id. at 80 (Lamar, J., dissenting). 
 23.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 24.  Id. at 163 (“The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a gov-
ernment of laws, and not of men.  It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the 
laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”). 
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are relevant to security.  Yet law never covers every contingency.  There are 
always gaps, unaccounted for cases, and rapid developments—eventualities 
that require the exercise of “discretion” in the sense of open choice.  Discre-
tion is the second form of security, and the Constitution, along with ordi-
nary federal law, provides for the election and appointment of officers to 
exercise such discretion.  We are a government of laws, but we are also, 
necessarily, a government of discretion. 
The majority and dissent in Neagle cleaved around the distinction be-
tween law and discretion.  Writing for the majority, Justice Miller pointed to 
the Take Care Clause of Article II,25 which states that the President “shall 
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”26  Justice Miller reasoned 
that the clause obligated the President to protect the judges of the federal 
courts, which Congress established by law.27  As Professor Henry Mona-
ghan described it, the Take Care Clause implied a “protective power” in the 
President.28  The President discharged this obligation, through the Attorney 
General, by directing the appointment of a judicial bodyguard.  Deputy 
Neagle, the man appointed, acted in pursuance of “a law of the United 
States”—that is, the Constitution—and habeas law required that he be dis-
charged from custody.29   
Writing in dissent, Justice Lamar pointed to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause of Article I,30 which vested in Congress the power to make laws 
necessary and proper not only for the exercise of its enumerated powers, but 
for the exercise of the President’s powers as well, including his take-care du-
ties.31  Thus, even if the President was obligated to keep the peace, the means 
by which he did so “must proceed . . . primarily from Congress.”32  Con-
gress had to provide for judicial bodyguards by passing a statute.  If, in-
stead, it let its power lie dormant, the President had no discretion to act.  
The authority to create such an office, to specify its powers and immunities, 
had to come from law—probably because of the effect it had on state au-
thority.33 
Marking a boundary between law and discretion in matters of security 
is the work of what I will call the “Security Court.”  The Security Court is a 
vision of the institutional structure of federal courts that puts the United 
                                                          
 25.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  In re Neagle, 135 U.S. at 64–68 (majority opinion). 
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63 (1993). 
 29.  In re Neagle, 135 U.S. at 75. 
 30.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. 
 31.  In re Neagle, 135 U.S. at 82–83 (Lamar, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, 
cl. 18). 
 32.  Id. at 83. 
 33.  Id. 
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States Supreme Court at the center of a collective deliberation about the 
form of domestic and national security.  The questions guiding the work of 
the Security Court are these: When must security be attained by law?  When 
may it be accomplished by discretion, and how (if at all) should that discre-
tion be bounded?  In short, how much “leeway” does government enjoy in 
ensuring our security? 
These concerns are siblings to a number of familiar procedural doc-
trines.  They include procedural due process and the arbitrary and capricious 
standard from administrative law, which requires that an agency examine 
relevant data and explain its action by reference to that data.34  In each 
case, courts are vindicating rule-of-law values, such as liberty, certain-
ty, predictability, and autonomy.  The aim of the Security Court is to pre-
serve these values, while ensuring government remains capable of answer-
ing threats.  The value placed on law explains why the Court generally 
requires the President to conform his discretion to statutory constraints, 
even in emergencies and when those constraints are implied rather than ex-
plicit.35  On the other hand, the Court recognizes the President’s discretion 
to act when he judges it necessary to fulfill a duty attached to his office, 
sometimes even contrary to law.  The case for this power rests on the bene-
fits of discretionary decision-making.  As I will show below, these consid-
erations drive many cases about the Constitution’s separation of powers, es-
pecially in what Justice Jackson called its “zone of twilight,” where the 
text’s distribution of authority is uncertain.36 
The remainder of this Essay has two parts.  First, I provide several 
other examples of the Security Court in action.  Second, I describe instances 
in which the Court  shrunk from such a role and the reasons why. 
I.  THE SECURITY COURT IN ACTION 
Consider the following two structural features of the United States Su-
preme Court.  First, it is a “constitutional” court, in the sense that is created 
by the Constitution itself, as one of the three great departments of the na-
tional government.  In contrast, inferior federal courts and executive agen-
cies are created by congressional legislation.  At the time the Framers draft-
ed the Constitution, state courts, too, were largely legislative in origin.  
Second, the Supreme Court is “supreme” in the sense that it stands atop a 
                                                          
 34.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976) (procedural due process); Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415–17 (1971) (arbitrary and capricious 
standard). 
 35.  Professors David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman noted the Court’s penchant for re-
solving national security cases by expansive statutory interpretation.  David J. Barron & Martin S. 
Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and 
Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 702 (2008). 
 36.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
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jurisdictional pyramid vested with the judicial power of the national gov-
ernment in cases at law, equity, and admiralty.37  Most states at the time in-
vested these jurisdictions in separate bodies, sometimes even including the 
legislature or executive, giving their court systems the form of a web, or 
parallel lines, rather than a pyramid.38  Thus, although not all cases were 
appealable to the federal Supreme Court, none could be appealed to a dif-
ferent high court.  As best we can tell, there was consensus among delegates 
at the Philadelphia Convention on the need to establish a single, national, 
supreme appellate court.39 
Why was there broad agreement on the need for a single, national, su-
preme appellate court?  For one thing, it was vital for security.  It is a familiar 
point that under the Articles of Confederation Congress could raise money 
only by requisitioning a portion of state tax receipts.  Since the states were 
largely broke and Congress lacked the means to enforce its requisitions, states 
rarely paid those requisitions.  Congress was forced to finance the Revolu-
tionary War by what we call “currency finance”—that is, by printing mon-
ey.  At one point, disgruntled officers who had been promised a pension 
gathered in Newburgh, New York, and there was talk they might march on 
Philadelphia and stage a coup.40  Obtaining revenue sufficient to finance the 
military was thus a vital security issue, and a supreme court with appellate 
jurisdiction over cases arising under the national revenue laws could ensure 
that taxes were duly paid and collected.41 
A single, national, appellate court would also provide important bene-
fits in matters of foreign policy.  Scholars of international law continue to 
debate the extent to which federal courts possess a power to apply custom-
ary principles of international law, thereby making foreign policy in the 
cases before them.42  But it is undisputed that the Court was understood to 
have a role in the enforcement of foreign policy.43  If treaties made by the 
President with the approval of the Senate were to be effective, the Supreme 
Court had to possess jurisdiction to enforce them.  It should come as no sur-
                                                          
 37.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 38.  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 138–43 (2d ed. 1985); 
see, e.g., SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS OF AN 
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 1606–1787, at 60, 261–63 (2011) (describing the initial constitutional 
organization of state court systems in Virginia and New York).  
 39.  WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF 
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 6 (1995); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., 
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 6–7 (7th ed. 2015).  
 40.  ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS: A CONTINENTAL HISTORY, 1750–1804, at 
317–18 (2016). 
 41.  CASTO, supra note 39, at 44, 48–49. 
 42.  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Fed-
eral Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 822–26 (1997).  
 43.  See, e.g., CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 6–12, 579 (3d ed. 2009). 
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prise, then, that the Judiciary Act of 178944 granted the Supreme Court juris-
diction over cases arising under treaties and suits brought by foreign nation-
als.45  The Court’s early docket reflected this design.  One in four cases 
heard in the Supreme Court under Chief Justices John Jay and John Mar-
shall concerned foreign affairs.  A significant portion of these cases in-
volved enforcement of trade embargoes and peace treaties.46  In these areas, 
noted a student commentator, “most recognized that the Court would help 
Congress and the President hold states to their federal commitments.”47  
Since peace with other nations depended on upholding our treaty obliga-
tions, the Court’s ability to enforce those responsibilities was essential to 
national security. 
But what was the Court to do when the different branches of govern-
ment could not agree on a foreign policy?  Early presidents sought to play a 
large role in the determination of foreign policy and, on occasion, exceeded 
or contradicted federal law.  The Court did not shy from such cases.  As 
Professor Harold Koh observed, “perhaps [the] most striking feature” of this 
early period “is the extent to which courts actively participated in the 
delineation and delimitation of the executive’s authority in foreign af-
fairs.”48  In the case of Little v. Barreme,49 the Supreme Court held that writ-
ten instructions from the Secretary of the Navy to a ship’s captain to seize 
certain vessels on suspicion of violating a federal trade embargo did not in-
sulate the captain from liability for exceeding the actual terms of the embar-
go.50  Congress had forbidden ships to travel to French ports, but the Secre-
tary of the Navy instructed Captain Little to seize ships coming from 
French ports.  The Court was careful not to conclude that the President, 
John Adams, lacked the authority to order such seizures during war.  The 
President’s “high duty,” observed Chief Justice Marshall, “is to ‘take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed,’” and to that end, as Commander in 
Chief of the Navy, he might employ American naval vessels to seize ships 
violating the embargo “without any special authority for that purpose.”51  Yet 
here Congress had not only enacted an embargo, but “prescribed . . . the 
manner in which this law shall be carried into execution,” thereby limiting 
the discretion the President normally enjoyed to decide how best to execute 
                                                          
 44.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
 45.  Id. at 77, 80–81. 
 46.  Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An 
Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855, 872–74, 883–84 (2005). 
 47.  Id. at 874. 
 48.  HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 81 (1990). 
 49.  6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
 50.  Id. at 179. 
 51.  Id. at 177. 
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the law.52  Congress supplanted discretion with law, and the Supreme Court 
vindicated its authority to do so.53 
Acting as a Security Court did not mean the Court would uniformly 
side with Congress.  Even in domestic matters, it might vindicate presiden-
tial discretion, just as it did in the Neagle case.  Several decades before 
Neagle, Justice Miller (the author of Neagle) joined the Court’s opinion in 
The Prize Cases,54 which recognized the need for presidential discretion in 
addressing the southern “insurrection” that became the Civil War.55  The 
question before the Court was the legality of a blockade at the Port of 
Richmond, Virginia ordered by President Lincoln, which netted a perky 
haul of 5,100 bags of coffee beans and some outgoing tobacco.56  Blockade 
was a military measure lawful under the customary laws of war, but Con-
gress had not declared war.  Nevertheless, reasoned Justice Grier, the Con-
stitution obligated the President to see federal law executed, which implied 
the discretion to decide appropriate measures when an insurrection inter-
fered with the execution of the law.57  Only the President could decide if war 
measures were necessary to meet the military objective; as Justice Grier 
quipped, “He must determine what degree of force the crisis demands.”58  In 
Justice Grier’s vision, then, the President’s authority to employ a blockade 
arose from his obligation to enforce the law and military command of 
armed forces.  It was a matter, in short, of a military necessity, and judg-
ments of military necessity were committed to the President’s discretion. 
As the risks of foreign policy grew in the twentieth century, so did a 
concern about the Court’s proper institutional role in foreign affairs.  Stakes 
seemed much higher in the eras of World War and Total War.  The danger 
and complexity of the post-WWII period triggered structural changes across 
government, as the foreign policy apparatus was reconfigured to contain 
communism by stationing military assets abroad.59  Starting in the mid-
1930s, the Supreme Court noticeably retreated from its jurisdiction in for-
eign policy cases and, on occasion, even from its role of Security Court.  
Yet it is at the opening of the Cold War that we encounter the Court’s most 
important articulation of its role in national security. 
                                                          
 52.  Id. at 170, 177–78. 
 53.  John C. Dehn, The Commander-in-Chief and the Necessities of War: A Conceptual 
Framework, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 599, 620 (2011).  
 54.  67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
 55.  Id. at 636. 
 56.  Id. at 637. 
 57.  Id. at 668. 
 58.  Id. at 635, 670. 
 59.  See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 52–99 (2013); KOH, 
supra note 48, at 93–113. 
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure)60 arose out of 
President Truman’s seizure of many of the nation’s steel mills in an effort 
to prevent a disruption in steel production by a labor strike.61  Five years 
earlier, though, Congress had passed the Taft-Hartley Act,62 which provided 
for mediation in such cases, preserving the unions’ right to strike and reject-
ing a presidential power to seize and operate industrial plants.63  In light of 
the statute, and the fact that the steel mills were domestic and not in the 
conventional theater of battle, the Court held that the President lacked con-
stitutional authority to seize the steel mills.64  Writing for the Court, Justice 
Black described the President’s order as “law making.”65  It was not law 
making merely because it was policymaking; Black would not have denied 
that the President could make policy in exercising his power to carry out the 
law.  President Truman’s order was law making because it effectively re-
pealed a law, the Taft-Hartley Act, and replaced it with a policy of the Pres-
ident’s own making.  There was no inherent, discretionary, emergency 
power in the President to repeal law.  Only law could undo law.66  This was 
a clear rejection of the Government’s view that the President had inherent 
power to “take such action as is necessary to meet the emergency”67—a power 
the Government traced to Article II of the Constitution, though the Gov-
ernment’s attorney declined “to get into a discussion of semantics.”68 
Justice Jackson’s concurrence, which has proven to be the most influ-
ential opinion in the Steel Seizure case, makes a similar point.  Jackson fa-
mously identified three categories of presidential power: (1) when the Presi-
dent’s act is consistent with the will of Congress, (2) when Congress is silent, 
and (3) when the President’s act is inconsistent with the will of Congress.69  
President Truman’s order fell in category three, to which, reasoned Justice 
Jackson, the Court should apply the greatest scrutiny.70  The rubric is help-
ful, but its real significance is often missed.  It is important not simply be-
cause it checks executive unilateralism and preserves an equilibrium be-
                                                          
 60.  343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 61.  Id. at 582. 
 62.  Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended in 
29 U.S.C.). 
 63.  Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 586. 
 64.  Id. at 587–89. 
 65.  Id. at 588. 
 66.  See id. (“The power of Congress to adopt such public policies as those proclaimed by the 
order is beyond question . . . .  The Constitution does not subject this lawmaking power of Con-
gress to presidential or military supervision or control.”). 
 67.  PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 1009 (6th ed. 
2015). 
 68.  THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: PART I–PROCEEDINGS IN DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF 
APPEALS, H.R. DOC. NO. 534, pt. 1, at 371 (2d Sess. 1952). 
 69.  Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 70.  Id. at 640. 
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tween the branches.  Rather, as Jeff Powell put it, formerly a senior attor-
ney in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, which advises 
the executive branch, the key idea is “legislative powers have legal priority, 
so that the existence of executive authority is regularly . . . dependent on 
what Congress could do and has done.”71  In other words, in the effort to 
mark a boundary between law and discretion, discretion generally retreats 
when law advances.  Executive power, therefore, does not imply a discretion 
to ignore law; it is shaped and limited by law.  The dynamic is characteristic 
of what Justice Jackson called “free [g]overnment,” or government “by 
those impersonal forces which we call law.”72  “[M]en have discovered no 
technique for long preserving free government,” he wrote in conclusion, 
“except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by par-
liamentary deliberations.”73 
II.  INSECURITY ABOUT THE SECURITY COURT 
The Supreme Court has not always acted as a Security Court.  At 
times, it has tried to be something more, at times something less.  Earlier I 
described the concern that by applying rules of customary international law 
to the cases before it, the Court would be in effect formulating our foreign 
policy, rather than enforcing a policy settled on by the other branches.  
There are reasons to doubt that an institution like the Supreme Court should 
have a hand in formulating foreign policy, given its limited expertise and 
lack of accountability.  Yet, in a basic way, when the Court limits, or refuses 
to limit, the scope of the President’s discretion in security matters, it is also 
making policy.  Suppose the President announces he is withdrawing our na-
tion from a treaty, but in litigation arising under the treaty, the Supreme 
Court enforces it despite the President’s announcement.  Is the Court mak-
ing foreign policy?  Isn’t it, at least in the case before it, electing the policy 
of the treaty?  Now imagine a slightly less extreme example: the Court 
simply disagrees with the President about the scope of the treaty and en-
forces it in cases the President concluded it should not apply.  Again, isn’t 
the Court making foreign policy by deciding the scope of the treaty? 
At times, the presence of complex, high-stakes policy questions has 
led Justices to express discomfort with exercising jurisdiction at all.  Con-
sider the case of Korematsu v. United States,74 where the Court upheld “ex-
clusion orders” issued by Army General John DeWitt, acting on the authori-
ty of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (“FDR”), resulting in the forced 
removal of over 100,000 men, women, and children of Japanese descent 
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from their homes on the West Coast.75  The orders rested on FDR’s authority 
as Commander in Chief, though Congress later invoked its own authority to 
criminalize disobeying the orders.76  Notably, Justice Jackson dissented 
from the Court’s decision upholding the removal on grounds that military 
orders were not subject to constitutional stricture at all.  The aim of military 
measures, he wrote, was to “be successful, rather than legal.”77  A constitu-
tional test requiring that military orders be reasonable (as the majority articu-
lated) was impossible to apply because judges had no capacity to determine 
whether military orders were reasonable.78  By upholding the General’s ex-
ercise of discretion as reasonable, the Court gave his removal policy consti-
tutional sanction.  According to Justice Jackson, the Court should do no such 
thing, and he would dismiss the case.79 
Pushed to its limit, these concerns have led the Supreme Court not on-
ly to carve out a large sphere for the exercise of presidential discretion, but 
to swear off any involvement in foreign policy.  This is how I read the fa-
mous case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,80 in which the 
Court upheld the presidential power, based on federal law, to criminalize 
the sale of weapons to Bolivia.81  Congress authorized the President to ban 
such sales by proclamation if he concluded that an influx of weapons would 
inflame the armed conflict in the region.82  Justice Sutherland, writing for 
the Court, stated that foreign affairs power was an aspect of the inherent 
sovereignty of the national government.83  It did not flow from a specific 
grant in the Constitution.  Among the branches of the national government, 
Justice Sutherland reasoned, the President alone was capable of handling 
the complex, sensitive issues that arose in representing the nation abroad.  
His office necessarily enjoyed a “very delicate, plenary and exclusive pow-
er . . . as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of internation-
al relations.”84  The nature of foreign affairs further implied that the Court 
“should not be in haste to apply” constitutional rules that originated in the 
context of domestic affairs, where the Court had a more substantial role to 
play.85  Justice Sutherland, the leading architect of this vision, pushed fed-
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eral courts to accept what one leading historian called a “sharply reduced 
role . . . as significant overseers of executive foreign policy decisions.”86 
While the Court later characterized Justice Sutherland’s more extreme 
statements in Curtiss-Wright as dicta,87 there remains considerable sympathy 
for the concern about judicial policymaking in foreign affairs.88  A related 
worry is whether there are proper judicial methods for marking a boundary 
between law and discretion, given the policy implications of these deci-
sions.  Usually the Court looks to familiar sources of lawyerly constitution-
al interpretation with a special focus on history, precedent, and the Consti-
tution’s internal structure.89  Yet the pressure to craft a solution that is both 
workable and legally limited can draw the Court into the spheres of the oth-
er branches.90 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court is at a point of transition.  It has just gained a new 
member, Justice Gorsuch, and, with Justice Kennedy’s retirement, will soon 
gain another.  Will the new Supreme Court be a Security Court?  This is not 
to ask whether the new Court will seek to preserve a place for executive 
discretion in matters of national security, whose value the Court has long 
acknowledged, but whether the Court will continue to delimit that discre-
tion in order to preserve the priority of law.  Thus, moving forward, we 
should ask two kinds of questions: First, does this Court understand its pre-
vious efforts to mark a boundary between discretion and law as properly ju-
dicial?  And second, does law retain the priority that Justice Jackson assert-
ed in the Steel Seizure case?  In areas of overlapping authority over national 
security, does this Court acknowledge that Congress may displace, shape, 
and confine presidential discretion by passing law?  As the branch least af-
fected by party politics, this principle may depend on judicial enforcement 
if it is to be realized. 
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